Abstract I examine optimal taxes in an overlapping generations economy in which each consumer's utility depends on consumption relative to a weighted average of consumption by others (the benchmark level of consumption) as well as on the level of the consumer's own consumption. The socially optimal balanced growth path is characterized by the ModiÞed Golden Rule and by a condition on the intergenerational allocation of consumption in each period. A competitive economy can be induced to attain the social optimum by a lump-sum pay-as-you-go social security system and a tax on capital income.
Conventional economic theory assumes that the utility of a person or a family is independent of the consumption of others. Yet a visit to the parking lot of a suburban shopping mall may tempt an economist to question this independence. Has the proliferation of sport utility vehicles owned by nonadventurous people in moderate climates resulted from factors that are the focus of traditional economic analysis, such as increased income or wealth, superior hedonic traits, or sharp reductions in the prices of these vehicles or their complementary goods, such as gasoline? Pending the econometric resolution of this question, I will pursue the temptation to question the independence of a person's utility from the consumption of others. A half century ago, Duesenberry (1949) questioned the apparent preference for Buicks over Chevrolets and developed a theory of consumption and saving based on the assumption that a person's utility is a function of that person's consumption relative to the average level of consumption in society. 1 I will assume that consumers use an endogenous benchmark level of consumption to evaluate their utility. I will specify the benchmark level of consumption to be a weighted geometric average of the contemporaneous consumption of all consumers in the economy. In addition to a person's own consumption, I will include in the utility function a person's own consumption relative to the benchmark level of consumption. Elsewhere, others and I have shown that including a benchmark level of consumption in the utility function can help account for various puzzling empirical moments of asset returns. 2 Here my focus is on the saving decision and aggregate capital accumulation.
3 I will modify the Diamond (1965) overlapping generations 1 "It is well known that there are societies in which prestige is gained by the acquisition of some sort of good which is completely useless in fulÞlling any need whatever. In spite of the complete uselessness of the things in question, their acquisition may be vital to the acquisition of prestige or maintenance of self-esteem. A great deal of effort may be expended in acquiring these useless items. In our society people may think that they expend effort to get a Buick instead of a Chevrolet because the Buick is more comfortable or goes faster. But this does not in the least prove that part of the basis for the purchase is not the maintenance of self-esteem." (Duesenberry, 1949, p. 29) 2 See, for example, Abel (1990 Abel ( , 1999 and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) . 3 Dupor and Liu (2002) develop a taxonomy for various features of consumption externalities. If utility is u (c, b), where c is the individual's own consumption and b is a benchmark that equals the average level of consumption by others, they deÞne jealousy as ∂u/∂b < 0 and keeping up with the Joneses as ∂ 2 u/∂c∂b > 0. They show that keeping up with the Joneses is important for asset pricing considerations and jealousy is important for consumption allocations. The utility function I use in this paper displays jealousy. It also displays keeping up with the Joneses for the case in which the curvature parameter model to include a benchmark level of consumption in the utility function of individuals. The introduction of a benchmark level of consumption leads to a straightforward modiÞcation of the equilibrium balanced growth path in a competitive economy. More interesting is the modiÞcation of the balanced growth path that maximizes a social welfare function that assigns geometrically declining weights to the utility of subsequent generations. The socially optimal balanced growth path is characterized by the same ModiÞed Golden Rule as in standard neoclassical growth models. However, the concern for consumption relative to the benchmark level of consumption introduces an optimality condition on the allocation of consumption across generations that are simultaneously alive.
Having derived the competitive balanced growth path and the socially optimal balanced growth path, the next step is to characterize a set of tax and transfer policies that will induce the competitive economy to attain the social optimum. In a standard neoclassical growth model without a benchmark level of consumption, a balanced-budget lump-sum intergenerational tax/transfer scheme, which could be interpreted as pay-as-you-go social security, can be used to achieve the appropriate level of saving for the economy to attain the ModiÞed Golden Rule. However, an additional Þscal tool is needed to attain the socially optimal balanced growth path when, in addition to the level of their own consumption, consumers care about their consumption relative to the benchmark level of consumption. This appearance of the benchmark level of consumption in the utility function introduces an externality in consumption, and, not surprisingly, the attainment of the social optimum requires a distortionary tax. 4 In particular, a capital income tax or subsidy, offset by lump-sum rebates or taxes, and accompanied by the appropriate social security system will induce the competitive economy to attain the social optimum.
In principle the optimal social security system could involve transfers from young consumers, who are working, to old consumers, who are retired, or the transfers could be in the opposite direction, from old to young. Also, the optimal tax rate on capital income could be positive, negative, or zero. I address these potential ambiguities by deriving conditions on exogenous parameters that determine the direction of the transfers in the optimal social α, introduced in equation (11) , is greater than one.
security system and the sign of the optimal tax rate on capital income. In addition, I present a set of illustrative calculations to demonstrate that, in a plausible example, the optimal social security transfers can be from young to old and that the optimal tax rate on capital income can be positive.
I use a standard neoclassical production function, which I present in Section 1. Then in Section 2 I deÞne the benchmark level of consumption and incorporate it into the utility function of an individual consumer. Using the utility function with benchmark levels of consumption, I solve the optimal consumption decision of a young consumer and characterize the equilibrium balanced growth path in a competitive economy in Section 3. I specify the objective function of the social planner in Section 4 and characterize the socially optimal balanced growth path. This characterization includes the standard ModiÞed Golden Rule and a condition that determines the optimal intergenerational allocation of consumption in each period. In Section 5, I derive and characterize the optimal tax and transfer policies that induce a competitive economy to attain the socially optimal balanced growth path. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 6. The appendixes contain derivations that would be distracting if presented in the text.
The Production Function
Consider a closed economy with overlapping generations of consumers who live for two periods. Each generation consists of a continuum of identical consumers. Let N t be the measure of the consumers born at the beginning of period t, and let G N ≡ N t+1 Nt ≥ 1 be the constant growth rate of the population. Consumers born at the beginning of period t inelastically supply one unit of labor in period t when they are young, and they supply no labor in period t + 1 when they are old. Thus, the measure of workers in period t is N t .
The economy uses capital and labor to produce a homogenous good according to the production function Y t = F (K t, A t N t ) where Y t is aggregate output in period t, K t is the aggregate capital stock at the beginning of period t, and A t is an index of labor-augmenting productivity which grows at a constant rate G A ≡
A t+1
At ≥ 1. The production function F (, ) is strictly increasing, concave, and linearly homogeneous in its two arguments K t and A t N t . It is convenient to write the production function in intensive form as
where
is the effective capital-labor ratio, f 0 (k t ) > 0 and f 00 (k t ) < 0. The marginal product of capital is f 0 (k t ) and the marginal product of labor is
as the elasticity of the production function f (k t ) with respect to k t , and assume that 0 < ε f < 1. I will assume that the labor market is competitive so that the wage income of a young consumer in period t is
Output produced during period t has three uses. An amount C t is consumed by each of the N t young consumers during period t, an amount X t is consumed by each of the N t−1 old consumers in period t, and the remaining output is devoted to creating the capital stock at the beginning of period t + 1, K t+1 = A t+1 N t+1 k t+1 . Therefore, the aggregate resource constraint in period t is
Using the assumptions that population and productivity grow at constant rates, G N and G A , respectively, rewrite the aggregate resource constraint as
Along a balanced growth path in this economy, the ratios k t ,
, and
are all constant. Therefore, both C t and X t grow at the rate G A , and the ratio Xt Ct is constant along a balanced growth path, 2 The Utility Function with Benchmark Consumption I will specify an individual consumer's utility function to depend in each period on the consumer's own consumption in that period and on a benchmark level of consumption based on the contemporaneous consumption of other consumers. In an overlapping generations model in which consumers live for two periods, there are two generations of consumers alive in each period, and the benchmark level of consumption is a function of the per capita consumptions of each of these two generations.
To specify the benchmark level of consumption more precisely, I will Þrst introduce some notation for consumption. Let c t be the consumption in period t of an individual young consumer (who was born at the beginning of period t), and let x t be the consumption in period t of an individual old consumer (who was born at the beginning of period t − 1). The variables C t and X t deÞned earlier are the per capita consumption levels of the young and old generations, respectively, and are not affected by the decisions of an individual consumer. An individual consumer born at the beginning of period t chooses c t and x t+1 and takes as given the values of C t , X t , C t+1 , and X t+1 . In equilibrium c t = C t and x t = X t because all consumers in a given generation are identical. Now consider the benchmark levels of consumption for a consumer born at the beginning of period t. Let ν y t be the benchmark level of consumption for a young consumer in period t and let ν o t+1 be the benchmark level of consumption for an old consumer in period t + 1. In each period the benchmark level of consumption is a weighted geometric average of the per capita consumption of the two living generations. SpeciÞcally,
and
The parameter θ y in equation (5) is the weight of the consumption of a representative old consumer relative to the consumption of a representative young consumer in the speciÞcation of the benchmark for young consumers. The restriction that θ y ≤ 1 implies that the benchmark for young consumers places at least as much weight on the consumption of a fellow young consumer as on the consumption of an old consumer. Similarly, the restriction θ o ≤ 1 in equation (6) implies that the benchmark for old consumers places at least as much weight on the consumption a fellow old consumer as on the consumption of a young consumer. To simplify notation, I rewrite the speciÞcation of the benchmarks in equations (5) and (6) as
The restrictions on ε y and ε o in equations (7) and (8) 
It will be useful to deÞne the (intratemporal) intergenerational consumption ratio σ t ≡ Xt Ct . With this deÞnition, the benchmark levels of consumption in equations (7) and (8) can be written as
Now I will specify a utility function that incorporates benchmark levels of consumption. The utility of a consumer born at the beginning of period t is
where α > 0, β > 0, and 0 ≤ η < 1. The felicity in any given period can be viewed as an isoelastic function (with elasticity 1 − α) of a geometric average of the consumer's own consumption and the consumer's own consumption relative to the benchmark level of consumption. For example, the consumer's felicity when young in period t is an isoelastic function of . The parameter η measures the (geometric) weight of the ratio of the consumer's own consumption to the benchmark level of consumption. If η = 0, this ratio does not enter the utility function, and utility is simply an isoelastic function of the consumer's own consumption, as in the conventional formulation of isoelastic utility. If η were equal to one, then the consumer's own consumption would affect utility only through its ratio to the benchmark,
, as in Abel (1990 Abel ( , 1999 5 . However, I rule out this case here by restricting η to be strictly less than one.
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I will rewrite the utility function in equation (11) using the expressions for ν y t in equation (9) and ν o t+1 in equation (10) to obtain (12) where
Note that the time subscripts in equations (13) and (14) refer to the time period in which consumption takes place rather than to the period in which the consumer is born. Thus, u o t+1 is the felicity during period t + 1 of an old consumer who was born at the beginning of period t.
Competitive Economy
In this section I examine the behavior of a competitive economy in which consumers have the utility function speciÞed in equation (12) and the aggregate resource constraint is described by equation (4) . I will introduce two Þscal instruments, which can be described as a pay-as-you-go social security system and a capital income tax. I focus on these two instruments 5 In Abel (1990) , the benchmark level of consumption in period t depends on the per capita level of consumption in period t − 1, rather than on the contemporaneous level of per capita consumption. In considering this difference, note that in Abel (1990) a period is one year, but in the current paper a period is one half of an adult lifetime. Also, in Abel (1990) , the parameter γ, which corresponds to η in the current notation, is set equal to one in the numerical calibration, though the theoretical analysis does not restrict γ to be equal to one. 6 Although η = 1 has interesting asset pricing implications, this value of η changes the nature of the social planner's problem. SpeciÞcally, if η = 1, the utility of a representative consumer born at the beginning of period t is unaffected by a doubling of c t and x t+1 , if C t , X t , C t+1 , and X t+1 are also doubled. (see, for example, equation 26).
because they will turn out to be useful in directing a competitive economy to a socially optimal balanced growth path, as I will show in Section 5.
First consider the pay-as-you-go social security system. Let T y t be a lump-sum tax paid by each young consumer in period t, and let T o t be a lump-sum tax paid by each old consumer in period t. If T o t is negative, then old consumers are recipients of transfers from the government and (if T y t > 0) the tax/transfer system involving T y t and T o t has the character of a social security system. I will impose the condition that the social security system is Þnanced on a balanced-budget pay-as-you-go basis by requiring
Social security taxes and beneÞts are indexed to the level of productivity measured by A t . SpeciÞcally,
The second Þscal instrument is a capital income tax that is rebated via lump-sum transfers to old consumers. Let τ K be the rate at which (gross) capital income is taxed. The pre-tax, or social, gross rate of return on capital held from period t to period t + 1 is f 0 (k t+1 ). Let R t+1 denote the after-tax gross rate of return on capital held from period t to period t + 1, which is
Pre-tax gross capital income per old consumer in period t + 1 is the marginal product of capital, f 0 (k t+1 ), multiplied by the amount saved by each young consumer in period t, w t − T y t − C t . Therefore, the capital income tax per old consumer is τ K f 0 (k t+1 ) (w t − T y t − C t ). Each old consumer in period t + 1 receives a lump-sum rebate, q t+1 , of the capital income tax, so
7 The lump-sum tax on old consumers, T o t+1 , and the lump-sum rebate of the capital income tax, q t+1 , can be combined into a single variable e T The lifetime budget constraint of a consumer born at the beginning of period t, taking account of the lump-sum social security taxes and transfers, the capital income tax, and the lump-sum rebate of the capital income tax, is
A consumer born at the beginning of period t chooses c t and x t+1 to maximize utility in equation (12) subject to the budget constraint in equation (19) . Along a balanced growth path σ t = σ and
= G A , and this decision problem is isomorphic to the following simple problem:
subject to equation (19) where
, evaluated in equilibrium along a balanced growth path (so that x t+1 = σc t+1 = σG A c t ). Thus, βM (σ) is the private marginal rate of substitution along a balanced growth path in the absence of productivity growth.
In Appendix A I show that along an equilibrium balanced growth path
Equation (23) is the intertemporal Euler equation of an individual consumer along a balanced growth path.
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It describes the long-run relationship between two endogenous variables, the after-tax rate of return, R, and the intergenerational relative consumption ratio, σ. In this relationship the elasticity of R with respect to σ is −ε M > 0 so that the R and σ are positively related.
The Optimal Balanced Growth Path
In this section I analyze the path of consumption and capital accumulation that would be chosen by a social planner who maximizes a particular social welfare function. The social planner chooses levels of consumption for each consumer, and, in principle, could choose different levels of consumption for two identical consumers born at the same date. However, I will assume that the social planner attaches equal weights to the utility of all consumers in a given generation. Since the consumption of each consumer is too small to affect the per capita consumption of that consumer's generation, all consumers in a given generation have the same benchmark levels of consumption as each other. Therefore, they have the same utility functions as each other, and, since utility is strictly concave in an individual consumer's own consumption, the social planner will choose equal consumption for all consumers in a generation.
Suppose that the social welfare function in period t is
In the social welfare function in equation (24), the parameter ρ is the discount factor applied to the total utility of a given generation relative to the total utility of the preceding generation, which has 1 G N as many people as the given generation. The restriction in equation (25) is necessary and sufficient for the sum in equation (24) to be Þnite along a balanced growth path.
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Since the social planner chooses equal consumption for all consumers in a generation, the utility of a representative consumer born at the beginning of period t is found by setting c t = C t in equation (13) and x t+1 = X t+1 10 Because the generation born at the beginning of period t − 1 consumes during period t (as well as during period t − 1), it is important that the social planner assigns a positive weight to U t−1 when making decisions at the beginning of period t. Therefore, the index j in equation (24) runs from −1 to ∞ rather than from 0 to ∞.
11 Along a balanced growth path,
. Therefore, along a balanced growth path, equation (24) is a geometric series in which each term is ρG N G in equation (14) , using the deÞnition of the intergenerational consumption ratio, σ t ≡ X t C t , and substituting equations (13) and (14) into equation (12) to obtain
The standard ModiÞed Golden Rule in overlapping generations economies 12 is a special case of the current model in which η = 0 so that benchmarks do not enter the utility function. In this special case, the social welfare function is maximized by an appropriate path of the aggregate capital stock, which implies an appropriate path of aggregate consumption. In the absence of consumption externalities (η = 0) the social planner has no particular target for the intergenerational consumption ratio, σ t . Indeed, the social welfare function is maximized by the intergenerational allocation of consumption that arises when individual consumers facing market rates of return-without capital income taxes-choose their optimal allocations of consumption over their own lifetimes. The introduction of consumption externalities (η > 0) implies that the social planner must target the intergenerational consumption ratio as well as the path of the capital accumulation. We can think of the social planner as Þrst choosing the optimal path of aggregate consumption and capital accumulation. Then, given this optimal path of aggregate consumption, the social planner chooses the intergenerational consumption ratio σ t . Unfortunately, the social planner's objective function is not concave in σ t for all permissible parameter values. To assure that the optimal value of σ t is characterized by the Þrst-order conditions derived in Appendix B, I will assume henceforth that α ≥ 1. This assumption does not guarantee that the social planner's objective function is concave in σ t , but it does imply that the value of the social welfare function approaches −∞ both as σ t approaches 0 and as σ t approaches ∞.
13 Therefore, the optimal value of σ t is strictly positive 12 See, for example, Samuelson (1968) and Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p. 100).
13 Equation (14) implies that when
. For a given amount of aggregate consumption in period t,
. For a given amount of aggregate consumption
and Þnite. Since the social welfare function is continuously differentiable in σ t for positive σ t , the optimal value of σ t will satisfy the Þrst-order condition. Let k * denote the socially optimal value of k t along a balanced growth path. As shown in Appendix B, k * satisÞes
Equation (27) is a generalization of the well-known ModiÞed Golden Rule.
In the standard formulation of preferences without benchmark levels of consumption, η = 0 and the ModiÞed Golden Rule in equation (27) takes the more familiar form, ρf
14 In the absence of productivity growth (G A = 1), the value of k * is not affected by the introduction of benchmark levels of consumption. In the presence of productivity growth (G A > 1), the introduction of benchmark levels of consumption will increase k * if α > 1, but will have not effect on k * if α = 1. Let σ * denote the optimal value of σ t along a balanced growth path. It is convenient to analyze σ * by deÞning the function
Appendix E shows that Ψ ³ σ * G N´e quals the ratio
, where
is the social marginal rate of substitution between current consumption of the young and next period's consumption of the old along a socially optimal balanced growth path, and MRS P (c t , x t+1 ) is the private marginal rate of substitution between these two consumptions along a socially optimal balanced growth path. The function Ψ (r) is useful in characterizing the socially optimal balanced growth path. Appendix D proves the following lemma, which describes various properties of Ψ (r).
14 The formulations of the ModiÞed Golden Rule presented by Samuelson (1968) and Blanchard and Fischer (1989) 
Parts (a), (b), and (c) of Lemma 1 state for positive r, Ψ (r) is positive, increasing, and has an elasticity with respect to r that is less one. When the private marginal rate of substitution, MRS P (c t , x t+1 ), equals the social marginal rate of substitution, MRS S (C t , X t+1 ), along a socially optimal balanced growth path, Ψ (r) = 1. Parts (d) and (e) of Lemma 1 describe cases in which Ψ (r) = 1. Finally, parts (f) and (g) of Lemma 1 describe limiting behavior of Ψ (r) that is helpful in ensuring that the characterization of optimal σ presented later is correct for the case in which α = 1.
Appendix B shows that the optimal value of the intergenerational consumption ratio σ * satisÞes
To interpret equation (29), use equation (27) to show that G α+η(1−α) A /f 0 (k * ) equals the social discount factor ρ, and substitute this expression for ρ into equation (29) 
Since the private marginal rate of substitution, MRS
, and since Ψ ³ σ * G N´i s the ratio of the social marginal rate of substitution to the private marginal rate of substitution, the term in square brackets in equation (29) is the social marginal rate of substitution, MRS S t+1 (C t , X t+1 ). Equation (29) simply states that the product of the social marginal rate of substitution and the social rate of return, f 0 (k * ), equals one, which is a standard Euler condition for intertemporal optimization.
Equation (29) characterizes the optimal intergenerational consumption ratio, σ * . I will devote the remainder of this section to analyzing the properties and implications of this equation. I will focus on two cases in which I can prove that there is a unique positive value of σ that satisÞes equation (29):
• Case I: α > 1.
• Case II: α = 1 and 0
The following lemma, which is proved in Appendix D, is useful in analyzing these cases.
Lemma 2 In Cases I and II, ε M + ε Ψ < 0 for r > 0.
Lemma 2 implies that the left side of equation (29) is a strictly decreasing function of σ in Cases I and II, so that if there is a value of σ that satisÞes this equation, that value is unique. Also, because the left side of equation (29) is strictly decreasing and continuous in nonnegative σ, the existence of a positive value of σ that satisÞes this equation can be proved by showing that the left side is greater than ρ for σ = 0 and is less than ρ for sufficiently large positive σ. These results are summarized in the following proposition, which is proved in Appendix D. Anticipating the results in Section 5.1 on the optimal capital income tax rate, it will be important to determine whether the optimal value of σ is greater than, equal to, or less than
ρ, then σ * is less than z. These arguments are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 In Cases I and II, sign [σ
Part (e) of Lemma 1 states that Ψ ³ ε y ε o´= 1 if ε y > 0 and ε o > 0, so that Lemma 3 implies Proposition 2 In Cases I and II, sign
Proposition 2 provides a condition on exogenous parameters that determines whether σ * is greater than, equal to, or less
It is easiest to interpret this condition in the case in which both benchmarks are equallyweighted geometric averages of the contemporaneous consumption of all consumers, so that θ y = θ o = 1, which implies that
Corollary 1 15
In Cases I and II, if
According to Corollary 1, if both benchmarks are equally-weighted geometric averages of the consumption of all consumers, a social planner with discount factor ρ equal to the time preference discount factor β in individual utility functions will equalize the consumption of young and old consumers in each period along a balanced growth path. If the social planner is more patient than individuals, so that ρ > β, then the social planner will allocate a higher level of consumption to young consumers than to old consumers in each period along a balanced growth path. To understand this result, consider the social planner's problem in period t along a balanced growth path. Suppose that the social planner has chosen how much capital to carry into period t + 1, and is deciding how to allocate the remaining output to C t and X t . In period t, having chosen k t+1 , the social planner chooses C t and X t to maximize u
where u y t () and u o t () are deÞned equations (13) and (14) . The Þrst term in equation (31), u y t (C t , C t , X t ), is increasing in C t and decreasing in X t , and the second term, ρ
, is increasing in X t and decreasing in C t . An increase in ρ β reduces the weight on u o t (X t , X t , C t ) and thus leads the social planner to shift current consumption away from X t toward C t , which is a reduction in σ t . This argument suggests that the optimal value of σ is a decreasing function of the ratio To analyze effects of ρ and β on the optimal value of σ, totally differentiate equation (29) with respect to σ and ρ β to obtain
Equation (32) and Lemma 2 imply the following proposition.
Proposition 3
In Cases I and II,
Inspection of equation (29) proves the following proposition.
Proposition 4 σ
* is independent of the specification of the production function, f (k t ), and of the growth rate of productivity, G A .
Fiscal Policy Along the Optimal Balanced Growth Path
In Section 4, I derived the values of the intergenerational relative consumption ratio, σ * , and the capital-labor ratio, k * , along the socially optimal balanced growth path. In this section, I derive the Þscal policies-speciÞcally the tax and transfer policies-that induce a competitive economy to attain these values along a balanced growth path. The strategy for determining the optimal tax and transfer policies is to assume that the competitive economy has attained the socially optimal balanced growth path and then to determine the values of the tax and transfer parameters that are consistent with competitive equilibrium along this balanced growth path.
Optimal Tax on Capital Income
To avoid considerations of dynamic consistency that can arise with a capital income tax, I assume that the Þscal authority can credibly commit to maintain a constant tax rate on capital income. To calculate the optimal tax rate on capital income, divide the expression for the competitive private rate of return on capital implied by equation (23) by the expression for the optimal marginal product of capital in equation (27), to obtain
Use equation (17) to rewrite the left side of equation (33) Therefore, equation (33) can be rearranged to obtain
where τ * K is the optimal tax rate on gross capital income.
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To understand the role of the capital income tax along the socially optimal balanced growth path, recall that MRS
epresents the wedge between the private and social marginal rates of substitution along a socially optimal balanced growth path. Along a balanced growth path, equation (17) states that R = (1 − τ K ) f 0 (k), so that 1 − τ K is the wedge between the private rate of return, R, and the social rate of return, f 0 (k). Setting 1
akes the wedge between the private and social rates of return exactly offset the wedge between the private and social marginal rates of substitution.
17 Equation (34) implies that the sign of the optimal capital income tax rate depends on whether Ψ ³ σ * G N´i s greater than, less than, or equal to 16 Erosa and Gervais (2000) and Garriga (2001) show that it is generally optimal to tax (or subsidize) capital income if individuals have labor-leisure choices throughout their lives. However, this result does not apply to the model I present here because labor is inelastically supplied in the Þrst period of life and zero labor is supplied in the second period of life. Thus, in the model I present here, the tax rate on capital along the socially optimal balanced growth path would be zero in the absence of the consumption externalities that I study here.
17 Along the socially optimal balanced growth path, 1 = MRS If ηε o = 0 and ηε y > 0, the consumption of old consumers imposes a negative externality on young consumers. Since old consumers do not take account of this externality, the value of σ ≡ X t Ct in a competitive economy without taxes would be higher than in the social optimum. To reduce the value of σ in a competitive economy, the social planner could reduce the private rate of return by introducing a positive tax rate on capital income.
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By contrast, if ηε y = 0 and ηε o > 0, the consumption of young consumers imposes a negative externality on old consumers, so the value of σ ≡ X t C t in a competitive economy without taxes is lower than in the social optimum. In this case, a negative tax rate on capital income would increase the private rate of return and increase σ. If neither generation imposes an externality on the other generation (ηε y = ηε o = 0), the optimal capital income tax rate is zero. (23) and the discussion below that equation that σ is positively related to R along a competitive balanced growth path. 20 In de la Croix and Michel (1999), the optimal tax rate on capital income is negative because of an asymmetry in the speciÞcation of benchmark consumption in the utility function. In their model, consumers live for three periods, and consume during middle age and old age. Middle-aged consumers have a benchmark level of consumption equal to the middle-age consumption of the previous generation, but there is no benchmark for old-age consumption. However, if their model were altered so that there is no benchmark for middle-aged consumption, but there is a benchmark for old-age consumption equal to the old-age consumption of the previous generation, then the optimal tax rate on capital would be positive, rather than negative. In the model I present here, in which consumers live for two periods (and the benchmarks depend on the contemporaneous rather than the lagged consumption of others), there are benchmark levels of consumption in both periods of a consumer's life and the optimal tax rate on capital could be negative, positive, or zero, as illustrated by Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 gives the sign of the optimal capital income tax rate if ηε y ε o = 0. The sign of the optimal capital income tax rate in the case in which ηε y and ηε o are both positive is given in the following proposition. 
Since ρ, β, G N , ε y , and ε o are exogenous parameters, Proposition 6 provides a condition on exogenous parameters that determines whether the optimal capital income tax rate is positive, negative, or zero. This condition takes a simple form when the benchmarks are equally-weighted geometric averages of the consumption of all consumers so that θ y = θ o = 1, which implies that
Corollary 2 In Cases I and II, if η > 0 and if
With benchmarks that are equally-weighted geometric averages of consumption, if the social discount factor, ρ, equals the time preference discount factor, β, the optimal tax rate on capital income is zero. Perhaps surprisingly, if the social planner is more patient than individuals, so that ρ > β, the optimal tax rate is positive. If ρ > β, the social planner wants to shift consumption toward later generations of consumers, and thus in each period wants to shift consumption away from old consumers toward young consumers. By imposing a positive tax rate on capital income, consumers are induced to shift consumption away from old age toward their youth. Equation (34) shows that for given values of η, ε y , and ε o , the optimal value of the tax rate on capital income depends only on 
, where the Þrst equality follows from equation (34), the second equality follows from parts (b) and (e) of Lemma 1, and the third equality follows from Proposition 2.
Corollary 3 In Cases I and II,
As suggested by the discussion following Corollary 2, an increase in ρ β shifts the optimal consumption toward later, younger, generations. The desired increase in consumption of the young relative to consumption of the old can be achieved by an increase in τ * K , which reduces the private rate of return on capital and induces consumers to shift consumption from old age toward youth.
Optimal Lump-Sum Intergenerational Tax/Transfer
Now consider the optimal lump-sum intergenerational tax/transfer, which can be interpreted as a lump-sum pay-as-you-go social security system. In period t along a balanced growth path, the aggregate tax on young consumers, which follows from equation (16), is N t
as the tax on young consumers, expressed as a fraction of total output, along the optimal balanced growth path. I show in Appendix C that for given values of the population growth rate, G N , and the elasticity of output with respect to the capital stock, ε f , the optimal tax on young consumers, τ y * , is
Equation (35) expresses τ y * as a function of an endogenous variable (σ * ) and a function of parameters (Λ). The following lemma describes the effect of the endogenous variable, σ * , on τ y * .
Lemma 4
Observe that the term in brackets is positive because ε f < 1 implies Lemma 4 states that if the optimal intergenerational consumption ratio, σ * , increases, the optimal lump-sum tax on young consumers, τ y * , increases. To understand this result, consider an increase in τ y , which transfers resources from young consumers to old consumers. An increase in the tax on young consumers reduces their saving, and an increase in the transfer to old consumers also reduces saving by consumers when they are young. The reduction in saving reduces the capital-labor ratio, k, along a balanced growth path. The reduction in k increases the social rate of return, f 0 (k), which increases the private rate of return, R. The increase in the private rate of return, R, induces consumers to substitute from current consumption to future consumption, thereby increasing the intergenerational consumption ratio, σ. Thus, an increase in the lump-sum tax, τ y , can be used to increase the intergenerational consumption ratio, σ, as stated by Lemma 4.
Lemma 4 can be applied to determine the effect on τ y * of a change in the time preference discount factor of consumers, β, because β affects σ * , but has no effect on Λ. Proposition 3 implies that an increase in β increases σ * , which, according to Lemma 4, increases τ y * . This reasoning proves the following proposition. An increase in the time preference discount factor, β, increases the amount of saving in the competitive economy and thus would increase the capitallabor ratio to a level higher than the ModiÞed Golden Rule level, k
* . An increase in the tax levied on young workers can offset the increase in saving and maintain the capital-labor ratio equal to k * . The effect of ρ on τ y * operates through two channels: an increase in ρ reduces σ * (Proposition 3), which reduces τ y * ; and an increase in ρ reduces Λ, which also reduces τ y * . This argument proves the following proposition.
Proposition 9
An increase in the social discount factor, ρ, increases the ModiÞed Golden Rule capital-labor ratio, k * , and requires an increase in saving, which can be induced by a reduction in the lump-sum tax on young workers.
I have referred to the lump-sum intergenerational tax/transfer system as a social security system, because it transfers resources from young consumers to old consumers, if τ y > 0. However, it is possible for τ y to be negative, in which case the tax/transfer system is a "reverse social security system" transferring resources from old consumers to young consumers. It is evident from equation (35) that the sign of the optimal value of τ y * is the same as the sign of σ * Λ − G N . Therefore, if Λ > 0, the sign of τ y * is the same as the sign of σ * − Λ −1 G N , which, according to Lemma 3, is the same as the sign of
. The following proposition provides the condition on the exogenous parameter Λ that determines the sign of τ y * .
Proposition 10 In Cases I and II, if Λ ≤ 0, then τ y * < 0, and if Λ > 0,
Numerical Example
I have derived expressions for the optimal values of the lump-sum tax levied on young consumers, τ y * , and the capital income tax rate, τ * K . I have also derived conditions to determine whether each of the optimal tax rates is positive or negative. In this section, I provide a numerical example, including a modest sensitivity analysis, to illustrate that both τ y * and τ * K can be positive in plausible cases. In this example, I assume that the labor share in income is 2 3 , which implies that ε f = 1 3 . I assume that the curvature parameter α in the utility function equals 4, which implies that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution equals 0.25. To specify the values of the parameters ρ, β, G A , and G N , I need to specify the length of a time period. Since a time period in the model is one half of an adult lifetime, I will assume that a period is 30 years. I set the time preference discount factor of consumers, β, equal to (0.98) 30 , so that the rate of time preference is approximately 2% per year. I assume that the social planner is more patient than individual consumers and set the social discount factor, ρ, equal to (0.99) 30 , which implies that the social rate of time preference is approximately 1% per year. Multifactor productivity in the United States grew at the rate of 1.2% per year from 1948 to 1998. In the model in this paper, labor-augmenting productivity growth is the only source of multifactor productivity growth. Attributing all of the growth in multifactor productivity to growth in labor-augmenting productivity, A, implies that the growth rate of A is Table 1 : Socially Optimal Balanced Growth Path the growth rate of A is 1.8% per year, and G A = (1.018) 30 . During the period 1948-1998, the population of the United States grew at the rate of 1.2% per year. However, this period included the baby boom. Instead of using data from the baby boom to calibrate the population growth rate, I use the Census Bureau's middle population projection over the entire 21st century to calculate a projected growth rate of 0.7% per year.
24 Therefore, I set G N = (1.007) 30 . I assume that the benchmark functions are symmetric in the sense that θ y = θ o , and I present results for three values of η and for three values of θ y = θ o , and the implied values of ε y and ε o , in Table 1 . The row with η = 0 shows the results for the standard model without benchmark levels of consumption. The column with θ y = θ o = 0 (which implies ε y = ε o = 0) shows the results under the assumption that a consumer's benchmark level of consumption depends only on the per capita consumption of the consumer's
own generation, and is independent of the per capita consumption of the other generation. Since the optimal social marginal product of capital, f 0 (k * ), is independent of θ y and θ o (equivalently, it is independent of ε y and ε o ), I present the value of f 0 (k * ) once at the beginning of each row, rather than repeating the same value in each of the columns of the row. The social marginal product of capital, f 0 (k * ), is the gross rate of return over a 30-year period. To help gauge the magnitude of f 0 (k * ), I also the present the annualized gross social marginal product of capital, f
. For instance, when η = 0.25, the optimal 30-year social gross marginal product of capital, f 0 (k * ), is 7.698, which implies an annualized gross social marginal product of capital, f 0 ann , of 1.0704, or equivalently, a net social marginal product of capital, f 0 ann − 1, of 7.04% per year. Each cell of Table 1 contains three rows, which present the values of the optimal intergenerational consumption ratio, σ * , the optimal capital income tax rate τ * K , and the optimal lump-sum tax on young consumers, τ y * . To help interpret the tax rate on capital, I will make two adjustments. First, I will annualize the tax rate. Equation (17) implies that the optimal capital income tax rate, τ * K , can be rewritten as 1
, where R and f 0 (k * ) are gross rates of return over a 30-year period. DeÞne τ * K,ann as the optimal tax rate on gross capital income, if the capital income tax is levied annually. This annual capital income tax rate satisÞes 1 − τ * K,ann = Rann f 0 ann where R ann ≡ R 1/30 is the annualized gross private rate of return. Therefore, 25 τ *
1/30 . The second adjustment converts the tax rate on gross capital income, f 0 ann , to the tax rate on net capital income, f 0 ann − 1. Letting τ * K,net be the tax rate on annual net capital income, Table 1 reports the values of τ * K and τ * K,net . For instance, when η = 0.5 and θ y ≡ θ o = 1, Table 1 shows that τ * K = 0.043, which implies that the tax rate on net annual capital income, τ * K,net , is 0.027, or equivalently, 2.7%. The optimal lump-sum intergenerational tax on young consumers, τ y * , is positive throughout Table 1 , ranging from 2.8% when η = 0.5 and θ y = θ o = 0 to 7.0% when η = 0. In the United States, the value of τ y is about 5%.
Sensitivity Analysis Baseline: parameter values in Table 1 Table 2 : SensitivityAnalysis Consistent with Proposition 5, the optimal capital income tax is zero when η = 0 or θ y = θ o = 0. For the cells in Table 1 in which η and ε y = ε o are positive, τ * K,net is positive but small, with a maximum value of 2.7% when η = 0.5 and θ y = θ o = 1. Table 2 presents a simple sensitivity analysis for the values of the annual gross marginal product of capital, f 0 ann , the intergenerational consumption ratio, σ * , the tax rate on capital, shown both as the tax rate on the 30-year gross marginal product of capital, τ * K , and the tax rate on the net annual marginal product of capital, τ * K,net , and the lump-sum intergenerational tax/transfer, τ y * , along a socially optimal balanced growth path. The baseline for this sensitivity analysis uses the parameter values in Table 1 with η = 0.5 and θ y = θ o = 1. Each row of the baseline changes one parameter value at a time.
Since θ y = θ o = 1 and η > 0, Corollaries 1 and 2 apply throughout Table   and GDP was $10,082 billion, so τ y was equal to 0.051.
2. Therefore, since ρ ≤ β throughout Table 2 , Corollary 1 implies that σ * ≤ 1, and Corollary 2 implies that τ * K ≥ 0. As in Table 1 , the optimal tax rate on capital income is small throughout Table 2 , with τ * K,net taking on its highest value of 6.7% in the case in which the social planner has a zero rate of discount, i.e., ρ = 1. For the two rows in which ρ = β (the row with ρ = (0.98) 30 and the row with β = (0.99) 30 ), the optimal intergenerational consumption ratio, σ * , equals one, as implied by Corollary 1, and the optimal tax rate on capital is zero, as implied by Corollary 2. With only two exceptions, the lump-sum tax/transfer system imposes a tax on young consumers and gives a transfer to old consumers. In the two exceptions, in which the lump-sum tax/transfer system subsidizes young consumers by taxing old consumers (a reverse social security system), the tax rate, τ y * , is smaller than 1.0% in absolute value.
Concluding Remarks
I have examined the implications for saving and capital accumulation of assuming that consumers care about their consumption relative to a benchmark level of consumption in addition to caring directly about their own consumption. In a competitive economy, individual consumers do not take account of the externality imposed by their consumption, and make their saving and consumption decisions taking as given the consumption of others. With the formulation of utility that I have used here, the introduction of a concern about consumption relative to the benchmark level of consumption is isomorphic to a change in the rate of time preference, from the viewpoint of an individual consumer. Thus, the introduction of concern about the benchmark level of consumption does not dramatically alter the nature of the equilibrium balanced growth path in a competitive economy. However, the characterization of the socially optimal balanced growth path is fundamentally affected by the introduction of a benchmark level of consumption because a social planner internalizes the consumption externality. Taking account of this externality, the socially optimal balanced growth path is characterized by a condition on the intergenerational allocation of consumption in addition to the ModiÞed Golden Rule condition, which speciÞes the optimal capital-labor ratio.
I derived a set of taxes and transfers that induces a competitive economy to attain the socially optimal balanced growth path. This set of taxes con-sists of a tax on capital income and a lump-sum intergenerational tax/transfer system that resembles pay-as-you-go social security. The optimal set of taxes has a couple of counter-intuitive features. First, though one might be tempted to think that the capital income tax is used to achieve the optimal capital-labor ratio, and the lump-sum intergenerational tax/transfer system is used to attain the optimal intergenerational allocation of consumption, this paper shows that the opposite is the case. If the benchmark level of consumption does not enter the utility, then the ModiÞed Golden Rule capital-labor ratio can be attained by lump-sum intergenerational taxes and transfers that lead to the appropriate level of aggregate saving; the optimal capital income tax rate is zero in this case. However, when the benchmark level of consumption enters the utility function, the socially optimal balanced growth path is characterized by an optimal intergenerational consumption ratio. This value of the intergenerational consumption ratio is attained by the appropriate value of the capital income tax. Indeed, the optimal tax rate on capital income in equation (34) is a function of the intergenerational consumption ratio, but does not depend directly on the capital-labor ratio.
A second counter-intuitive feature of the optimal set of taxes concerns the optimal capital income tax when the social planner is more patient than the individuals. One might be tempted to think that in this case, the social planner would want to foster capital accumulation at a higher rate than in a laissez-faire competitive economy, and thus the optimal tax/transfer system would include a subsidy to capital. However, with benchmarks that are equally-weighted geometric averages of individual consumption (θ y = θ o = 1), I derive the opposite result: the optimal capital income tax rate is positive when the social planner is more patient than individuals. In this case, the social planner wants to shift consumption toward future, i.e., younger, consumers. Thus, relative to laissez faire, in each period the social planner wants to shift consumption away from old consumers toward young consumers, and a positive tax on capital income achieves this goal in a competitive economy.
A Competitive Balanced Growth Path
This appendix characterizes the private rate of return, R, and the capitallabor ratio, k, along a competitive balanced growth path. Use equation (19) to substitute for x t+1 in equation (20), differentiate with respect to c t , and set the derivative equal to zero to obtain
Use the facts that c t = C t and x t+1 = X t+1 in equilibrium and that along a balanced growth path R t+1 is constant and X t+1 = σG A C t to obtain
which implies equation (23). Also use these facts to rewrite the budget constraint in equation (19) along a balanced growth path as
Now use equation (17) 
Equation (A.4) is linear in C t and can be easily solved for C t to obtain
The aggregate capital stock at the beginning of period t + 1, K t+1 = A t+1 N t+1 k t+1 , equals the aggregate saving of young consumers during period t. Therefore,
Use equation (A.5) to substitute for C t in equation (A.7) to obtain
Use equation (2) 
and rearrange equation (A.9) to obtain
B Optimal Balanced Growth Path
This appendix derives the values of σ and k along the socially optimal balanced growth path. First, rewrite the aggregate resource constraint in equation (4) in terms of C t and σ t (rather than in terms of C t and X t ) as
Using equation (26) for the utility of the representative consumer born at the beginning of period t, the Lagrangian for the problem of the social planner maximizing the social welfare function in equation (24) subject to the aggregate resource constraint in equation (B.1) is
2) Differentiating L with respect to C t+j , σ t+j , and k t+j+1 , and setting each derivative equal to zero, yields
Now conÞne attention to balanced growth paths so that 
(B.6) Equating the gross growth rates of both sides of equation (B.6), and setting C t+1 C t = G A along a balanced growth path, yields
Substitute equation (B.7) into equation (B.5), and let k * denote the value of k along the optimal balanced growth path, to obtain
Let σ * denote the value of σ t along the optimal balanced growth path. To determine σ * , Þrst evaluate equation (B.4) along a balanced growth path and use the deÞnition of M (σ) in equation (21) 
Now use equation (B.9) to substitute for ρλ t C t A t in equation (B.6) and rearrange to obtain 
C Optimal Intergenerational Tax/Transfer
This appendix derives the optimal intergenerational transfer in equation (35). First, rearrange equation (A.6) to obtain
Now substitute the expression for f 0 (k * ) from equation (27) into equation (C.1) and rearrange to obtain an expression for φ −1 along the socially optimal balanced growth path
Finally, substitute equation (C.3) into equation (C.2) and multiply both sides of the resulting equation by σ * to obtain
Using the deÞnition τ y * ≡ 
E Private and Social Marginal Rates of Substitution
The private intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is MRS P (c t , x t+1 ) ≡ β ∂u o t+1 /∂x t+1 ∂u y t /∂c t . Differentiate equation (13) with respect to c t and equation (14) with respect to x t+1 , and evaluate these derivatives using the deÞnition σ t+1 ≡ X t+1 C t+1 and the fact that in equilibrium c t = C t and x t+1 = X t+1 to obtain MRS P (c t , x t+1 ) = β C Now evaluate MRS P t+1 (c t , x t+1 ) along a balanced growth path using the facts that σ t+1 = σ t and C t+1 = G A C t along a balanced growth path to obtain MRS P (c t , x t+1 ) = βG (E.4) Use equations (13) and (14) to calculate the derivatives in equation (E.4), and evaluate these derivatives using the deÞnition σ t+1 ≡ X t+1 C t+1 and the fact that in equilibrium c t = C t and x t+1 = X t+1 to obtain MRS S (C t , X t+1 ) = Now evaluate MRS S (C t , X t+1 ) along a balanced growth path using the facts that σ t+1 = σ t and that C t+1 = G A C t along a balanced growth path to obtain MRS S (C t , X t+1 ) = βG .
(E.8)
To simplify the expression on the right hand side of equation (E.8), use the following lemma. 
